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    3. 題目:Which Enemy to Dance with? A New Role of Software Piracy in Influencing Anti-piracy Strategies 2021-12-20


      題目:Which Enemy to Dance with? A New Role of Software Piracy in Influencing Anti-piracy Strategies


      講座專家:耿先駿 教授

      時間:2021年12月24日上午10:30

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      https://tulane.zoom.us/j/95509129572?pwd=MlRCNWNhMC9PRXBLT0VIY1U0MjVKUT09&from=addon

      Meeting ID: 955 0912 9572

      Passcode: 160337


      摘要:Software piracy is a challenging issue faced by software firms and governments all over the world. To control software piracy, firms exert considerable effort in anti-piracy measures. This paper uses game theoretical models to study how software firms should determine their anti-piracy efforts and product prices. There are two unique aspects of our model. First, anti-piracy efforts have both a direct effect and a cross effect on software piracy. Second, we capture two types of competitions when piracy exists: one between a legitimate product and a pirated product, and the other between two pirated products. We find several interesting results. We show that due to pirated products' buffer effect not studied before, eliminating piracy does not necessarily mean higher profit for firms. This helps explain why some software firms still provide a desktop version and suffer cost from piracy although a Software as a Service (SaaS) version can totally eliminate piracy. Direct and cross effects have different impact on firms' decisions and profits. Opposite to what one might expect, when a firm's anti-piracy effort becomes more effective in increasing the cost of pirating its own product but not its competitor's product, the firm becomes worse off under certain conditions. By contrast, if the anti-piracy effort's cross effect is higher, therefore increasing the cost of pirating its competitor's product, a firm will always be better off. The managerial implication is that if a firm ignores the cross effect, it could under-invest in anti-piracy effort, causing its profit to suffer.


      1BD2E專家簡介:Xianjun Geng is a Full Professor of Management Science and Freeman School Distinguished Chair in Business at the A. B. Freeman School of Business, Tulane University. His research interests include pricing, supply chain management, business analytics, information security and behavioral economics. His work has appeared in Management Science (in IS, Marketing and OM departments), Information Systems Research, MIS Quarterly, Journal of Management Information Systems, Production and Operations Management, Journal of Marketing, Marketing Science, Journal of Retailing and other academic journals.


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